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Abstract 
 A vast proportion of the national security architecture to fight the amorphous global ‘war on 
terror’, created after 9/11, remains untouched. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has expressed a 
commitment to ensuring that agencies such as the AFP and ASIO have the expertise, capacity 
and resources to collect and analyze the information needed to combat terrorism. Rudd has also 
identified a commitment to stop a terrorist attack while not compromising the integrity of 
democratic traditions and constitutional processes. This paper will address the tone and direction 
of the Rudd government’s approach to the problem of terrorism, examine proposed reform in key 
areas of national security legislation and explore the judicial mechanisms that are in place to 
assure that the security sector conducts its business in accordance with the law, national 
intelligence priorities and the protection of fundamental human rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Rudd government and national security: Is judicial oversight necessary? 
Introduction 
 In a post 9-11 world, the rationale for the Australian approach to deal with current or potential 
terrorist threats has received much attention. The introduction of a more broad-based, intrusive 
national security and law enforcement infrastructure is considerable. Both major political parties 
have expressed a commitment to security framework that will ensure intelligence agencies such 
as the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) have the expertise, capacity and resources to collect and analyze the information needed 
combat terrorism and related activities in a ‘risk society’ (see Beck, 1992). PM Kevin Rudd 
(2010) has argued that “…terrorism has become a persistent and permanent feature of Australia’s 
security environment”. At the same time, the Rudd Government broadly reinforced an assurance 
to professionally administrate a regime of intervention and detention powers that do not 
recklessly compromise the integrity of democratic traditions, processes and institutions. 
 Critics of terror laws have respond by claiming that not only do expanded executive powers too 
often fail to offer a best-practice response to real or perceived threats but the Government’s focus 
has not been matched with the development of realistic safeguards to limit abuse or error. 
Extraordinary anti-terrorism laws, such as preventative detention, are linked to various assertions 
concerned about the violation of long-standing democratic arrangements that have allowed the 
protection of basic human rights and due process. For example, Michael Pearce claims that the 
introduction of emergency police search powers to conduct warrantless searches under Rudd 
have not been justified and are excessive. “The search powers seem to have come out of the blue. 
There has been no evidence that police are unduly limited by the requirement to get a warrant” 
(cited in Pearlman, 2009). It can also be argued that the creation of unproductive, 
disproportionate laws might actually cause more damage than good by alienating moderate 
communities whose cooperation will remain vital in combating terrorism and countering the 
appeal of radical ideologies.  
 The primary aim of this paper is to examine developments in Rudd government’s counter-
terrorism program with an emphasis on detention regimes and the existing mechanisms that are 
in place to assure that the security sector conducts its business in accordance with the law, 
national intelligence priorities and the protection of fundamental human rights. The central focus 
of the paper is on Australia’s domestic intelligence agency ASIO and its detention powers as 
well as the preventative detention orders that may still be sought by the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP). As such, this paper will highlight key provisions within the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth) and changes to the Criminal 
Code within the Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) 2005 (Cth). In order to ensure that Australia’s 
counter-terrorism efforts remain effective and appropriate, it will be argued that checks and 
balances, particularly better judicial oversight, should be treated as an important instrument not 
only to enable a clearer legal mosaic but to provide for a culture of accountability and 
consultation that will go a long way toward the protection of basic human rights. 
Australia’s legislative landscape 
 Since the tragic events of 9/11, Australia’s counter-terrorism strategy has been completely 
remodeled due to the gravity of evolving terrorist threats. For some, the failure of law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies to forecast terrorist-related patterns, and forestall attacks 
such as the London and Bali bombings, was a powerful confirmation of the need for wholesale 
reform to legislative frameworks. Reflecting such a mindset, the former Howard Government 
(1996-2007) displayed a determination to create a more mobile, flexible, and intelligence-driven 
response. Indeed, since 9/11, the Australian government passed more than 30 bills and 44 terror 
laws to dismantle terrorist networks and to prevent terrorists from carrying out their plans. Such 
a challenge has included the creation of a range of far-reaching arrangements such as preventive 
detention and detention without charge for questioning (see Williams and Lynch, 2006).  
 Former PM John Howard had been eager to extend executive authority and a range of legislative 
initiatives to enhance law-enforcement and intelligence powers, in part, based on international 
obligations such as Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) that had been adopted soon after 
9/11. Resolution 1373 intended to restrict the movement, organization and fund-raising activities 
of terrorist groups. Security experts like Ross Babbage added that the Australian Government 
had a unilateral duty by remove rigid operational and legal boundaries to ensure that the 
intelligence community could swiftly act against those preparing or planning terrorist violence. 
The security sector needed “…to be restructured to permit the full weight of technical and human 
resources to be applied against priority targets, whether they be international, domestic or both” 
(cited in Walters, 2009). And given the primary responsibility of government to protect its 
citizens and their right to life in borderless world, others extend this argument by admitting that 
that the introduction of anti-terror powers will inevitability distort traditional constitutional 
practices and the democratic freedoms traditionally embedded in Western legal systems (see 
Etzioni 2004).  
 
 After the Labor Party won federal election in late 2007, PM Kevin Rudd set about to 
differentiate himself from his predecessor by promoting an overhaul of security methods to deal 
with terrorism. Nonetheless, in many ways, his fundamental approach to international or 
domestic threats has not proven to be a stinging indictment of the former Government. Rudd’s 
counter-terrorism response has exposed a strong degree of consistency and cosmetic change 
rather than ‘out of the box’ thinking. The Rudd team has maintained several key dimensions of 
the Howard world view, including the elevation of perennial “…threats that are inherent to the 
transformational view of the strategic environment” such as international terrorism and non-state 
actors (see Clarke 2008, 272). In February 2010, Rudd’s tough line approach to national security 
broadened ASIO’s powers beyond the prevention of terrorism to border protection and the 
targeting of people-smuggling gangs (Narushima and Pearlman, 2010). Legislation had 
incorporated a proposed a new offence of providing material support for people smuggling that 
would involve 10 years jail and/or a fine of $110,000. 
 The Rudd government’s national security efforts (cited in Shape 2009) have been driven by the 
message that the “…threat of terrorism is alive and well and this requires continued vigilance”. 
As such, a successful fight against difficult to identify enemies has been directly linked to the 
collection of intelligence, the desirability of extended surveillance and the ability to make good 
intelligence product. Not surprisingly, Rudd has remained highly receptive to projecting his 
strong national security bona fides and operational insights in debate about terrorism and how to 
counter it. “There’s a bit of a danger that we all get numbed to the terrorist threat…It’s a word 
which is used, and people have become so used to it over the last near decade, that it no longer 
bites home” (Rudd, 2010). On the other hand, the conduct of Rudd government has shown 
examples of a greater degree of appreciation then the former Government in the merits of 
integrating national responses, parliamentary processes and listening to public feedback, at 
various levels, as a regular part of the policy development stage (Peatling, 2009).  
 In December 2008, the Rudd government had announced its formal response to a number of 
inquiries that had examined modern components of Australia’s counter-terrorism landscape. For 
all practical purposes, the response approved a majority of recommendations that had been 
previously identified by parliamentary committees and other independent inquiries, including a 
public investigation by John Clarke into the mishandled case of Dr Mohamed Haneef. In July 
2007, Haneef had been falsely accused of assisting a terrorist organization and detained without 
charge for 12 days before the charges were dropped (Pearlman, 2009). The Haneef case had 
reinforced some concerns about whether counter-terrorism laws where consistent with human 
rights standards. The case also highlighted the need to ensure adequate safeguards and review 
mechanisms to guarantee that new laws did not escalate the potential for abuse or error or 
illegality or that intelligence advice was not manipulated by policymakers. It was later revealed 
that ASIO had reported to officials that Haneef had no terrorist connections (Shanahan 2008). 
AG Robert McClelland stated that mistakes had been “totally unacceptable” (cited in Pearlman 
and Moore, 2008). Stephen J. Keim,  former barrister for Haneef noted that “…if you create 
legislation that when you write it you don’t actually know what it means - and then you extend 
and extend it - ultimately a case like Dr Haneef’s case will happen because no body knew what 
the legislation meant” (cited in Kellett, 2009).  
 Key aspects of proposed changes included: 
 Creating an independent National Security Legislation Monitor to review the 
operation, effectiveness and implications of counter-terrorism laws on an annual 
basis. The Monitor would be based along the lines of Britain’s Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Laws.  
 Implementing parliamentary oversight of the AFP by the establishment of a 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement.  
 Extending the mandate of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) 
to enable the IGIS, by direction of the Prime Minister, to extend inquiries to cover 
other agencies such as the AFP.  
 Changing the title of the sedition offence in federal laws from “sedition” to “urging 
violence”, clarifying and modernising the elements of the offence, and repealing 
provisions enacted in the 1920s proscribing “unlawful associations”. 
 Accepting and implementing all 10 recommendations of the Clarke Inquiry “to 
improve the operation of relevant legislation and promote cooperation and 
information sharing between government departments and agencies in 
counterterrorism measures”.                                                         (McClelland, 
2008a).     
 In August 2009, the Rudd government released a 452-page discussion paper of draft laws to 
update national security and counter-terrorism legislation. It stated that the measures outlined in 
the discussion paper were intended to “…give the Australian community confidence that our law 
enforcement and security agencies have the tools they need to fight terrorism, while ensuring at 
the same time that our laws and powers are balanced with appropriate safeguards, and are 
accountable” (McClelland 2009). Overall, many of the proposed amendments, such modifying 
the pre-charge detention regime by expanding the length of time of individuals can be held 
without charge and without judicial oversight to a maximum of 7 days (and 20 hours of 
investigation time), had been anticipated. Sally Neighbour (2009) observed that Rudd 
government’s recycled goals aimed “… to bolster and circumscribe the existing laws. Its target, 
in short, is to keep Australia safe from terrorism while removing some of the most glaring flaws 
in the hope of avoiding future debacles such as the Haneef case”. Richard Ackland (SMH, 2009) 
claimed that the Rudd government’s approach “…seems to be about softening a few things at the 
edges…and cranking up other powers”. Nicola McGarrity (2009) concluded that several 
proposals were simply “tinkering around the edges”.  
 In February 2010, Rudd, after much delay, released the government’s white paper on counter-
terrorism. While some such as terrorism expert Clive Williams (cited in ABC News, 2010) 
labelled the paper as “predictable”, it was also true that clear differences with the former Howard 
Government where less significant than might have been expected. In releasing its national 
security blueprint, the white paper confirmed an expansive view of the executive power. It 
reinforced the dangers of terrorism as a continuing and permanent strategic threat. And a core 
focus appeared to be a judgment about the changing nature of the terrorist threat to Australia and 
the escalating radicalisation of individuals in the Australian community – the rise of the so-called 
home-grown terrorists (see Ungerer 2010). Such a reemphasis, in part, had been motivated by a 
series of high-profile police raids and arrests in Melbourne and Sydney to disrupt a potential 
terrorist attack. Under revised terrorism laws, in February 2010, five men had been sentenced to 
maximum terms ranging from 23 to 28 years for ‘conspiring to commit acts in preparation for a 
terrorist act or acts’.  
 Despite the specific circumstances surrounding the counter-terrorism case, some cautioned that 
Rudd, like the previous Howard Government, was in danger of over-exaggerating the threat of 
home-grown terrorism. “I think the focus on home-grown terrorism in the white paper and in the 
Government’s presentation of it is a little bit confected...We always knew that home-grown 
terrorism was a significant issue (but) I don’t see anything in the policy prescriptions in the 
document that indicate the Government’s actually going to do much serious about it” (White, 
2010). Significantly, the so-called war on terrorist networks had no clear endpoint. Neither the 
White paper nor discussion papers expanded discussion into the enhanced role for judicial 
review in controversial law such as preventative detention regimes without charge or conviction 
or ASIO’s ongoing ability to grab and detain individuals who are not suspected of any offence. 
Despite some positive steps to address past mistakes, the maintenance of contentious detention 
powers have not been matched by any particular special protections, especially in regard to 
extended judicial oversight, to ensure security agencies operate professionally and with 
propriety. “The main advantage of having oversight by someone like a judge is that it keeps the 
police on their toes” (cited in Pearlman and Banham 2009).  
ASIO Detention 
 
 In contrast to powers in the US and the UK, ASIO has been given far-reaching powers to detain 
and interrogate persons not suspected of any particular offence, but who might have information 
important to the gathering of intelligence in relation to a “terrorism offence”, without charge or 
trial. 
 Previously, ASIO had no powers of arrest or interrogation. Based on the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth), ASIO can require either a 
Questioning Warrant or a Questioning and Detention Warrant and hold an individual in detention 
for questioning without charge for no more than 168 hours (7 days) (ASIO Act 1979 ss. 34S). It 
is worth highlighting that the established detention powers would apply not only to terrorists or 
would-be terrorists but also to non-suspects with no clear ties to suspected terrorists; individuals 
who might have inadvertently come into contact with a person with knowledge about terrorist 
deeds. 
 Such detention may take place pursuant to a “warrant for questioning” issued by an “Issuing 
Authority” (ASIO 1979 s. 34AB). It is sufficient that the Issuing Authority - either a federal 
magistrate or judge appointed by the Attorney-General (the Minister responsible for ASIO) – 
was satisfied that the Director-General of ASIO has obtained the Minister’s consent to the 
warrant and that there are “reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant will substantially 
assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism offence”, even if no 
act of terrorism had occurred (ASIO Act 1979 s. 34G(1)). 
 Once apprehended, the detainee can be questioned by ASIO in the presence of a “Prescribed 
Authority” - a person who has previously been a judge of the High Court, Federal Court, Family 
Court, Supreme or District Court of a State or Territory (ASIO Act 1979 s. 34B). During this 
period, the detainee may be interrogated by ASIO agents for up to a total of 24 hours (ASIO Act 
1979 s. 34J). Continuous periods of questioning are at a maximum of three eight-hour blocks 
(ASIO ACT 1979 s. 34R) unless a longer period is permitted by the Prescribed Authority before 
which the individual is being questioned. The Prescribed Authority may only permit questioning 
to continue if the they are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to deem that an extension 
will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism 
offence and questioning of the person under the warrant is being conducted properly and without 
delay. 
 
 The questioning of the person must be videotaped (ASIO Act 1979 s. 34ZA). The Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security may be present at the questioning or taking into custody 
(ASIO Act 1979 s.34P). A person is permitted to contact a lawyer of his or her choice (ASIO 
1979 s. 34ZO). In some circumstances, questioning may start in the absence of that lawyer (ASIO 
Act 1979 s. 34ZP). When a lawyer was present, they are not permitted to actively advise their 
client or interrupt or object to questioning except to “request clarification of an ambiguous 
question” (ASIO Act 1979 s. 34ZQ(6)). The prescribed authority can direct the removal of a 
lawyer if deemed to be “unduly disrupting the questioning” (ASIO Act 1979 s. 34ZQ(9). In such 
a situation, the detainee is permitted to contact an alternative lawyer. (ASIO Act 1979 s. 
34ZQ(10). Individuals can face a five-year jail term if they refuse to co-operate or answer 
questions or, to the individual’s knowledge, give false and misleading statements (ASIO Act 
1979 s. 34L).  
 
 Preventative Detention 
 The Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005 Bill had been passed on 7 December 2005. New powers 
would allow the AFP to apply for preventative detention orders for a short period of time. Then 
Attorney-General Philip Ruddock insisted that the laws were a “…further demonstration of the 
Government’s commitment to the national security of Australia” (Ruddock, 2005). Anticipating 
more terrorist violence, the legislation sought to promote special mechanisms to allow detention 
without trial - that would eventually allow suspects to be held for up to 14 days.  
 New Division 105 of the Criminal Code provided for a regime that would allow the AFP to 
target suspects who had not committed a crime or had had any criminal involvement and take 
them into custody and detain them for a short period to prevent an imminent terrorist attack or to 
preserve evidence of a recent terrorist attack (ss. 105.1(1)). The Commonwealth preventative 
detention regime initially had provided for a detention regime for up to 48 hours in a terrorist 
situation. At a later COAG meeting, States and Territories were asked to allow for the detention 
of a person for longer detention periods of up to 14 days, for all practical purposes taking over 
from the Commonwealth due to constitutional restrictions on the capacity of the Federal 
executive. At the time, John Von Doussa (2005) considered that “…the government is clearly 
banking on the idea that the period of detention is so short under the Commonwealth legislation 
that this is all academic, particularly when the detention is ‘preventative’ rather than ‘punitive’, 
and giving the reasons for detention might be prejudicial to national security”. 
 The principle of judicial oversight had been repeatedly enforced during the COAG 2005 
meeting. Victoria Premier Steve Bracks stated that “…judicial oversight has been a principle 
which has been supported by the Prime Minister, the Premiers and the Territory leaders, and 
there is complete judicial oversight over these new criminal sanctions which will be in place. 
There’s also legal representation for individuals, which is a principle which is a very important 
principle which needs to be supported” (Press Release, 2005). SA Premier Mike Rann concluded 
that “…the bottom line is that the safeguards are in the place, judicial review, and a series of 
accountabilities, a series of safeguards being established by statute” (Press Release 2005). Yet, 
despite such colorful rhetoric, the legislative framework remained inadequate in providing the 
basis for effective judicial study. 
 Preventative detention orders do not automatically require judicial authorization. The AFP is the 
initial applicant of the order and a senior AFP Officer is the issuing authority (ss 105.8). A 
person detained cannot be questioned except to confirm their identity or to enable safe detention 
(ss105.42) (2). Further, an individual could only ring their immediate family or advise an 
employer that they were safe but would not able to be contacted for the time being. No further 
information was allowed to be given (ss. 105.35(2)). While a detained person may contact a 
lawyer for the purposes of obtaining advice or instructing the lawyer to act on their behalf 
(ss.105.36), the government is specifically exempted from having to provide the detainee with 
any information “if the disclosure of that information is likely to prejudice national security” (ss. 
105.32(2)). A Continued Preventative detention order may be sought by an AFP officer and 
granted by an issuing authority - a Federal Judge or Magistrate appointed by the Attorney 
General (s105.2). 
 Safeguards and the Security Sector 
 In 2009, Martin Scheinin, the UN Special Rapporteur on the protection of Human Rights, 
discussed the advancement of democratic principles in order to enhance respect for human rights 
and rule of law in times of public emergency. He urged all member states to reduce to a 
minimum the practice of arbitrary executive power and state secrecy. Scheinin (2009) stated that 
he was worried by the “…increasing use of State secrecy provisions and public interest 
immunities for instance by Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, the United Kingdom or the United States to conceal illegal acts from oversight 
bodies or judicial authorities, or to protect itself from criticism, embarrassment and – most 
importantly – liability.” In 2006, a similar UN report had targeted restrictive conditions and a 
lack of key human rights protections in Australia. The report expressed a suite of concerns about 
notional safeguards within a system that had drastically changed the political and legal landscape 
by introducing a range of unprecedented counter-terrorism measures, including incommunicado 
detention (Scheinin, 2006).   
In a post 9/11 world, while recognizing the growing reliance on anticipatory operational 
capabilities and good intelligence to protect national security, appropriate oversight and scrutiny 
remains indispensable to ensure quality control, uphold civil liberties, to restore legitimacy to 
counterterrorism programs, to expose governmental malfeasances and to consider whether 
official secrecy requirements are warranted or counter-productive do remain essential. Frederic 
F. Manget (1996, 43) has used the term ‘oversight’ to describe a system of accountability in 
which those vested with the executive authority in an organization have their actions reviewed, 
sometimes in advance, by an independent watchdog who has the mandate to both check and 
appraise actions. Magnet (1996, 44-45) concluded that the role of independent courts remained 
highly relevant in judging the legality of government actions and policies and to prevent 
executive ‘overreach’ in democratic societies. Or as former Chief Justice of the Australian High 
Court commentated, “…neither ASIO nor the Attorney-General is a suitable guardian of 
individual rights” (cited in Walters, 2005: 19). At the very least, as noted by A-G Robert 
McClelland, “Australians acknowledge that tough counter-terrorism arrangements are necessary, 
but they don’t believe our security agencies should be given carte blanche in their application” 
(McClelland, 2008a).  
 Critics have warned about the inherent dangers of allowing the executive branch to bypass the 
courts, especially given the functioning of a massive secret bureaucracy for covert action. “The 
possibilities of abuse of such power are very real. For example, in the US, it was once revealed 
the FBI and the Justice Department had supplied “…false information in regard to more than 75 
applications for search warrants and wiretaps’ for terrorist suspects. Information had also been 
improperly shared with prosecutors in charge of criminal cases, thereby raising the issue of 
misuse of intelligence information to gain criminal convictions” (Williams 2002: 214). Another 
overseas studies into preventive detention programs that had been introduced, such as at the 
height of IRA bombings in Britain in the 1970s, do reveal a track record of blatant 
discrimination. “Of the 7072 (mostly Irish) people detained under the Prevention of terrorism 
Act between 1974 and 1991, only 14 per cent had changes brought against them. Many of the 
other 6087 were held for days at a time – left with the stigma of being an Irish person arrested on 
suspicion of being involved in terrorism” (Barns, 2005: 18). Interrogation and arrest often 
appeared crudely based on suppressing political dissent or lawful political protest. Interestingly, 
the British laws originally developed to fight the IRA are still described as only ‘temporary’ 
powers. 
 
Judicial Review  
 In examining the nature of the specific detention regimes in Australia, judicial review and 
oversight will not put a stop to detention. But it is clear that effective judicial safeguards against 
possible abuses or error are not always apparent. For example, AFP preventative detention 
requires that all communications between detainees and their lawyers be monitored by a police 
officer (ss. 105.38). The restrictions to legal representation violate the principle of client-lawyer 
privilege and the basic principle of confidentiality. Existing measures also place stringent 
constraints on access to lawyers and the right to useful legal council to ensure the protection of 
their client’s rights. The person’s lawyer is prohibited from disclosing the fact that a preventative 
detention order has been made, or that they are detained or any information the detainee gives 
during the contact, except for the purpose of Federal Court proceedings or a complaint to the 
Ombudsman (s105.38). In other words, the “…role of the lawyer is minimal, bordering on non-
existent, merely a token gesture” (cited in Morris and Riley, 2003).  Julian Burnside (2005) has 
expressed concern that limiting the capacity for legal representation might be used to intimidate 
detainees or led to wider circumstances of ill-treatment. “I don’t think the safeguards are 
adequate because if you exclude or qualify the use of lawyers, then the potential for the misuse 
of power is increased. We’ve seen in other circumstances that the law enforcement authorities 
can make mistakes, and they can get a mistaken idea of what's going on and pursue theories that 
turn out to be ill-founded”.  
 Given the importance of a security sector effectively tackle perceived threats to national 
security, the challenge for the Rudd Government to provide an accurate determination of the 
limits of law, a well as  what is ‘necessary and appropriate’ to meet evolving threats, is a highly 
difficult task. But conditions for judicial review and oversight remain a crucial safeguard to 
ensure fairness and protection from arbitrary and/or over zealous police and government 
interference in a liberal democracy. In the case of existing laws such as preventative detention 
for suspects and ‘criminal types’, the threshold for detention remains very depleted – in effect, 
the gathering of raw intelligence data is accepted as a alternate for hard, direct evidence. Adding 
to concerning issues about the breath of the legislation, Rudd suggested that the official 
definition of a terrorist act – which is already broad – should be expanded to include conduct that 
causes psychological harm as well as tangible physical harm (see Franklin, 2008). 
 The initial preventative detention order is authorized on the basis of wide ranging police 
discretion, not evidence that must be tested before a court. Given that a preventative detention 
orders is not made the courts, there are strong concerns such a process might create an 
environment that is conductive to the rise of arbitrary and/or politically motivated assessments 
(while being procedurally unfair). Indeed, the only information on which the issuing authority 
determines the application is provided by the AFP, and is untested by counter evidence or 
examination. Further, there is no obligation on the AFP to provide the detained person or their 
lawyer with anything other than a copy of the order (s105.29(7)), such as the reasons, 
information or material upon which the order was made (s105.28).  
  In regard to the ASIO act, the legal checks and balances against the misuse of government 
power again remain slight. Independent judicial review should be a principal mechanism for 
ensuring legal compliance and the protection of individual rights. Yet no thorough judicial 
scrutiny of ASIO’s conduct is allowed. As mentioned, instead of vesting oversight power in all 
federal judges, the law allows the Attorney-General to appoint a judge or magistrate as an 
Issuing Authority. Counter-terrorism laws have created an unprecedented role for judges who 
now might find themselves not considering whether people where innocent or guilty of an 
offence but instead making estimates whether the order might prevent the future risk of 
terrorism. Judicial officers are essentially putting into effect an inherited policing function – a 
task of the executive.  
 The NSW Law Society previously expressed fears that the existence of such provisions could 
erode the pillar of judicial independence. The Government can engage in ‘judge shopping’ by 
handpicking judges who they believed might be most likely to simply rubber-stamp orders and 
who have a track record of being sympathetic to executive demands (Merritt, 2005: 6). It warned 
that judges needed to play a more sophisticated role than simply confirming existing paperwork 
at the request of the Government.  
 Current measures also do not allow a court to verify or test the accuracy of one-sided or open-
ended intelligence information on which the detention order might be issued. The court would 
have no possibility of testing the information that is produced by authorities. In such 
circumstances, it would be highly unlikely that a judge would be prepared to attempt to 
anticipate or predict the intentions of the AFP from a position of relative ignorance. In reality, 
the role of the judge appears to remain little more than simply checking that the technical 
requirements for issuing the order have been satisfied. Alternatively, a detainee has no ability to 
seek judicial review of the validity or terms of the ASIO warrant. Critically, individuals face the 
prospect of having to prove to ASIO that there is a reasonable possibility they do not possess 
certain information or material. The onus of proof is on the detainee to produce evidence to 
prove their innocence (ASIO Act 1979 s. 34L(3)).  
 The ASIO and Anti-Terrorism Bills fundamentally altered a number of basic principles within 
Australia’s criminal justice system. Rudd has ignored addressing such deficits that fail to ensure 
a greater degree of certainty and fairness. Detention powers depart from traditional legal 
positions like the presumption of innocence, the right not to be detained without charge and the 
normal common law ‘right’ to silence. As mentioned, those detained also have no right to know 
why they are being hauled off for interrogation. It can also be suggested that the existing 
preventative detention regime in Australia might violate the rights of citizens that are conferred 
in international law within article 9(1) of the ICCPR, which provides: “Everyone has the right to 
liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one 
shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as 
are established by law”. 
 The wide scope of such anti-terror measures implicated for the ‘war on terror’, including 
preventative arrest and the detention of terrorist suspects, do carry significant legal, social and 
political implications. It is worth highlighting the increased emphasis on national security in 
locations such as the US and UK had been aimed at terrorists that while in Australia detainees 
did not need to be suspected of any offence (Michaelsen, 2003, 283). In considering the 
Australian government’s desire to change the dynamic of ‘law and order’ politics to incorporate 
the detention of non-suspects, others wondered “…if the United Kingdom could survive the 
terrorism of the IRA without changing the fundamental nature of its legal system, the question 
must be asked what is there about al-Qaeda that now requires some of the fundamental values 
of…(Australian)…democracy to be overturned?” (cited in Dick, 2006, 11). Core elements of the 
Australian government’s detention program are free of judicial scrutiny while undermining the 
time-honored doctrine of a separation of powers. “Without a doubt the greatest contemporary 
challenge to relations between the arms of government, and to established civil and political 
rights, comes from the powerful expansion of security in the name of countering terrorism” 
(Hocking 2004, p. xi).  
Conclusion 
 In early discussions to meet the urgent requirements of national security, the Rudd government 
had set about to reinforce executive authority and maintain comprehensive law-enforcement and 
intelligence powers. While Rudd has set about to deliver a partial revision of Australia’s 
counterterrorism program, his government also has not endeavored to justify, or repair, 
continuing shortcomings in critical areas such as preventative detention. Indeed, thresholds for 
detention in Australia remain at a very low level. 
 Like the Howard era, the Rudd Government has placed a strong emphasis on enhancing the 
capacity for security and police organization to act decisively in emergency situations. Its 
legislative push has copied much of the Howard program by to aim at retain, and in some areas 
enhance, the ability for authorities to discharge broad powers at an early enough stage to defend 
likely targets and deny a violent act. The principal question is the extent to which the exercise of 
the discretionary and intrusive powers of the state is a justified, proficient and balanced response 
in dealing with terrorism. At the very least, there is an obvious need to reflect the conditions for 
human security, the nature of democratic principles applicable to the intelligence community and 
the proper accountability arrangements for organizations with an unprecedented scope of 
strategic priorities. 
  In many significant ways, as exposed by the problematic nature of detention regimes in 
Australia, Rudd’s approach failed to deal with deficiencies inherited from the previous 
Government. In order to ensure that Australia’s counter-terrorism efforts remain effective and 
well-adjusted, and recognizing the essential need to protect intelligence sources and methods, it 
can be argued that checks and balances, including extended judicial oversight, should be treated 
as an important instrument to ensure the protection of basic human rights and rule of law. The 
judiciary remains a vital check on the potential abuse of the executive and legislative powers. It 
is worth remembering that the motivations of many former laws were repeatedly delivered to 
provide primary control on government actions rather than the governed. As Lucia Zedner (2005, 
510-511) reflected:  
Typically, conflicting interests are said to be ‘balanced’ as if there were a self-evident 
weighting of or priority among them. Yet rarely are the particular interests spelt out, 
priorities made explicitly, or the process by which a weight is achieved made clear. 
Balancing is presented as a zero-sum game in which more of one necessarily means less of 
the other…the experience of criminal justice is that balancing is a politically dangerous 
metaphor unless careful regard is given to what is at stake. 
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